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Abstract
Purpose of the article: The purpose of this article is to analyse the remuneration of senior 
executives in large enterprises in the Czech Republic through a structured questionnaire survey 
to analyse the factors that affect remuneration, interdependence and specification of the area.
Methodology/methods: This article uses secondary research resources from the Web of 
Science and Scopus database systems. A database of Amadeus has been used to select a sample 
of companies, which contains reports of nearly 20 million European companies, including 
those from the Czech Republic. General scientific methods such as the analysis, comparison 
and statistical methods were used to calculate frequencies, average, and median values.
Scientific aim: The aim of the article was to highlight the system of rewarding senior executives, 
revealing the factors that affect the amount of rewards. The questionnaire survey also focused 
on identifying the motivation of these workers.
Findings: Large firms in the Czech Republic are limited in the number and therefore the 
presented study has certain limits. This article focuses on the evaluation and analysis of the 
system of rewarding a selected group of employees in large enterprises.
Conclusions: Remuneration is a very specific part of business management. The questionnaire 
survey conducted among the Czech Republic’s large companies showed that top management is 
rewarded in terms of the performance and company performance. The manager’s remuneration 
then depends on the size of the enterprise, and this premise was also confirmed by the Kendall 
tau statistical method.
Keywords: remuneration CEO, compensation, wage, principal-agent model, and senior 
manager
JEL Classification: D91, J33, M52
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Introduction
The issue of rewarding senior executives is a 
key area of personnel management and cor-
porate governance. This is a still very discu-
ssed topic, which seeks to answer the most 
important question: How to set up business 
governance rules so that all stakeholders be-
have effectively? High-ranking managers are 
a specific group in which the creation of a re-
muneration contract must ensure the optimal 
linking of their performance with measurab-
le business indicators. The consequences of 
their decisions can be evident for up to seve-
ral years, and therefore setting optimal scales 
is more than important.
In the current world, almost every rela-
tionship is contracted. How should a two-
-party contract be concluded so that the best 
possible solution is offered to both parties? 
Nor is it otherwise in the business where the 
principal-agent relationship is established. 
As a principal, we imagine the shareholder 
or the owner of the company, and as a ma-
nager agent. How to set up business gover-
nance rules so that all stakeholders behave 
effectively?
The manager’s remuneration actually re-
flects the cost of human capital provided by 
them, the job the manager would otherwise 
offer on the management market. Therefore, 
its setting must be motivating and economi-
cally attractive for the manager to respond to 
the demand of the company, to assume the 
function and to remain in it. In addition, the 
value of the manager’s work is increased by 
the level of education, experience gained and 
experience or personal qualities. If the man-
ager’s performance is inadequate or ineffici-
ent, and for these reasons the manager loses 
his / her position, then his / her value in the 
labour market also drops. Managerial repu-
tation in the labour market is therefore the 
main driving force for him / herself (Richter, 
2005).
The aim of the article is to evaluate a 
structured questionnaire survey, the main 
purpose of which was to collect measurab-
le parameters that affect the remuneration of 
selected employees and the identification of 
the ways and forms of remuneration. Other 
objectives of the research were to find inte-
rest in the selected group of workers on the 
ownership interests and motivation of these 
workers.
2.  Theoretical framework
The basic paradigm of remuneration is the 
interest of the company’s owners to mini-
mise the costs of representation by aligning 
the interests of shareholders and managers 
of the company. Motivational tools therefo-
re act as “carrots and sticks” in the form of 
sanctioning tools. If a manager is involved in 
the company’s profitability, then it is highly 
likely that by their behaviour and decision-
-making he will contribute to the develop-
ment of the company, which will increase 
the reward for their efforts. The manager’s 
remuneration should therefore always reflect 
the true quality of his/her performance and 
his / her contribution to the company’s goals, 
both short-term and long-term (Easterbrook, 
Fischel, 1981).
According to Merhebi et al. (2006), inter-
national evidence confirms the significant 
link between company size and the top ma-
nager’s reward. The largest companies are 
supposed to hire the best and most power-
ful managers to maximise the company pro-
ductivity. Empirical evidence supports this 
theory (Oetomo, Swan, 2003), which means 
that the size of the firm partly determines the 
required managerial skills.
The research by Merhebi (2006) shows 
that managerial rewards significantly corre-
late with industry and market developments 
when the market and the economy are in a 
growing part of the business cycle. As the 
economy gets into a recession, such a strong 
correlation does not occur, and managers’ re-
wards either remain the same or fall slightly.
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According to Klein, Coffee (2007), rewar-
ding the reward for the company’s financial 
performance on a global scale is positively 
evaluated. As with any reward, this form of 
remuneration will also positively influence 
the performance of the manager if perfor-
mance criteria are set in advance and fulfil 
the promised rewards once they have been 
met.
The remuneration (compensation of work) 
of top managers is, as with other employees, 
composed of a fixed and financial variable 
wage component. Like other employees, 
they also gain a number of benefits, wheth-
er financial or non-financial ones. The com-
ponents of executive rewards are, however, 
more numerous and more complex than 
those of lower-level employees. Some types 
of rewards are unique to their profession, 
such as stock options, profits, etc. (Payscale, 
2018).
The main positive aspect of the form of 
remuneration associated with the option pro-
grammes is to tie management interests with 
the interests of the owners and reduce repre-
sentation costs. However, as has been shown 
in honour, this form of remuneration can 
also be misused. The author Coffee (2005) 
describes in his article Theory of Corporate 
Scandals: Why the U.S. and Europe Differ 
the negative effects of opt-outs where this 
form of remuneration has influenced the fi-
nancial statements in order to appreciate the 
share price. This may have been due to the 
linking of the value of shares with short-term 
criteria rather than long-term ones.
The ever-increasing pressure in a global-
ised economy leads the economist to try to 
express more effectively and evaluate the 
economic benefits and success of business 
activities. For an enterprise, it should not be 
crucial to generate a certain amount of profit, 
but it should always be true that the return on 
equity of the invested capital is greater than 
the alternative cost of capital. It is therefore 
a distinction between accounting profit and 
so-called economic gain that arises when not 
only current costs but also costs of capital are 
paid (Holečková, 2006).
Therefore, normal performance indicators 
that are calculated on the basis of the values 
in the financial statements are not sufficient 
to look for other measurement and perfor-
mance alternatives to their valuation and to 
build indicators of material involvement of 
managers. One of these is the Economic Val-
ue Added (EVA) indicator produced by the 
Stewart & Co. consulting firm (Holečková, 
2006).
According to Stern (2014), EVA remuner-
ation is most appropriate, not only for the top 
management level, but this form of remuner-
ation is appropriate for the whole organisa-
tion and must be passed on. If we could filter 
out the economy, which accounts for about 
50% of the joint stock company’s perfor-
mance and the influence of industry, another 
25%, we would be able to achieve the lev-
el of management’s achievement. It follows 
that 75% of the company’s shares are affect-
ed by the factors that have nothing to do with 
the management of the company.
The manager’s remuneration actually re-
flects the cost of human capital provided by 
them, the job the manager would otherwise 
offer on the management market. Therefore, 
its setting must be motivating and economi-
cally attractive for the manager to respond to 
the demand of the company, to assume the 
function and to remain in it (Richter, 2005).
Remuneration is a critical part of a com-
pany strategy that affects the performance of 
the entire company by motivating employees 
and attracting and retaining highly qualified 
employees (Gerhart, Rynes, Fulmer, 2009), 
with employee wages accounting for 60 to 
95 per cent of the company’s average cost.
Most research combining remuneration 
with business strategy relies on agency-cost 
theory and focuses on executive rewards. 
Its impact on the corporate strategy is un-
deniable (e.g. Dalton et al. , 2007; Wowak, 
Hambrick, 2010), given the importance of 
addressing and recruiting senior managers 
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and their financial motivation for deci-
sion-making. Nevertheless, the top manage-
ment wage costs are on average only a few 
percentage points of the company’s total 
wage costs (Whittlesey, 2006).
According to the management theory of 
the company, the main idea is that manag-
ers address the optimisation role of the long-
term position of the company on the market. 
Therefore, their motivation differs from the 
motivation of the owners, because they are 
much more tied with the company. There is 
therefore a real disconnection of ownership 
from driving. Managers do not even maxi-
mise profits at any specific moment, as it 
is about the company’s long-term position 
in the market and long-term stable profits 
(Riegel, 2007).
2.  Methodology
From the point of view of the practical use 
of statistical methods in the field of the eval-
uation of empirical data, testing of statisti-
cal hypotheses is one of the most important 
areas. The role of hypothesis testing is to 
decide, based on the collection of data and 
information obtained from random selection, 
whether it is possible to accept or reject a 
specific hypothesis regarding the base pop-
ulation. The statistical hypothesis can be un-
derstood as any assertion that may relate to 
unknown parameters given by the function 
of the parameters and other properties of the 
basic set (Řezánková, 2011).
There are always 2 hypotheses, namely 
the hypothesis tested (zero – H0) and the al-
ternative hypothesis (H1). The objective of 
the zero hypothesis testing is to determine 
whether it is possible or not to accept or re-
ject a zero hypothesis in relation to the the 
alternative hypothesis. Since two answers to 
the question are possible, then there are two 
types of mistakes (Řezánková, 2011).
The first step in statistical testing is always 
the formulation of the statistical hypothesis, 
i.e. the formulation of research questions in 
the experiment into the form of zero and al-
ternative statistical hypotheses that are put 
in testing against one another. The second 
step in testing the statistical hypotheses is 
to determine the level of significance of the 
test (error a chosen by the expert), which is 
the probability that the zero hypothesis will 
be rejected, although it is true. It should be 
remembered that we always accept or re-
ject the tested hypothesis based on the re-
sults of random selection, and therefore the 
rejection and rejection of the H0 hypothesis 
may be correct but also incorrect. Errors that 
we can commit are summarised in Table 1 
(Řezánková, 2011):
The final step in testing statistical hypothe-
ses is to formulate the conclusion of the test. 
It is usually done in two ways, by comparing 
the calculated test criterion with the critical 
value (determined depending on the chosen 
level of significance a). In the statistics, the 
probability of error of the first species – the 
level of significance α – is chosen as the de-
cisive input parameter of the test. In the tech-
nical areas, the level of significance α=0.05 
is usually chosen, in special cases (some 
medical applications), the probability of er-
ror of type I is increased (selected α=0.01) 
(Řezánková, 2011).
The Kendall’s correlation coefficient is a 
type of a coefficient that has a simple proba-
bilistic interpretation. Its theoretical value is 
Table 1.  Testing hypotheses – Type I and Type II errors.
Conclusion of the test
Reality
H0 is valid H0 is invalid
Accept H0 The right decision Type II error
Deny H0 Type I error The right decision
Source: Řezánková, 2011.
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called Kendall’s tau. Statistics are based on 
inversions in order. It is based on the metric 
or ordinal evaluation of n objects according 
to two criteria X and Y, where each evalua-
tion is assigned to each object (xi, yi). The 
pairs must be ordered so that the xi values 
form a growing sequence. If there is a posi-
tive correlation between the variables X and 
Y, then yi will have a comparable upward 
trend (with a negative association, the ten-
dency decreases). In the first case, there is 
a concordance or discordance in the second 
case. The number of concordances and dis-
crepancies is P or, Q their difference is the 
so-called Kendall’s S, a simple degree of 
dependence. In relation to whether P or Q 
prevails, the value S is positive or negative 
(Hendl, 2009).
The presented article is based on the results 
of a pilot structured questionnaire survey 
focused on the remuneration of senior man-
agers in large enterprises in the Czech Re-
public. For the purposes of the questionnaire 
survey, large companies were defined by the 
Commission Regulation (EC) No. 800/2008 
according to the following parameters:
 ● the number of employees is higher than 
250,
 ● while the turnover of the company exceeds 
EUR 50 million or the balance sheet total 
of the annual balance sheet exceeds EUR 
43 million.
According to the following criteria, 
444 compliant companies from the whole 
Czech Republic were selected for research, 
which could be involved in the questionnaire 
survey. To find a satisfactory set of compa-
nies, the Amadeus database was used. The 
questionnaire survey took place in August 
and September 2018 and during this time, 
with a total of 75 respondents, i.e. 75 com-
panies. The author of the contribution based 
on theoretical knowledge and secondary re-
search assumes that in the Czech Republic, 
employees are in the same or similar positi-
ons in the same way. The return on the ques-
tionnaire is therefore 16.89%.
The partial objectives of the questionnaire 
survey were:
 ● collecting and analysing measurable para-
meters that affect the remuneration of se-
lected employees,
 ● finding ways and forms of remuneration,
 ● identifying interest in ownership of these 
employees in companies where they cu-
rrently work,
 ● obtaining information on the motivation of 
these workers.
The companies were selected according 
to the main subject of business (the research 
was focused on enterprises with the main 
business subject falling into the categori-
sation of CZ NACE into category C – ma-
nufacturing industry). The objective of this 
questionnaire survey was to obtain objective 
data from the sample of respondents, which 
would be sufficiently representative. When 
formulating the questions, the author relied 
on a general reluctance to provide sensitive 
information, and so everything was formula-
ted so that no respondent had any reservati-
ons about providing the information.
For the present article, 3 working hypo-
theses were formulated, which were evalua-
ted in Statistics Version 24, which will be 
described in more detail on the following 
pages.
The questionnaire was divided into 4 parts. 
In the first part of the questionnaire, the in-
formation was collected about a particular 
person, i.e. the sex, the age of the respondent, 
how long they have been in the job, how 
many employees they manage or how many 
hours they work on a weekly basis on holi-
day or on public holidays. If the respondent 
stated that they worked on holiday or public 
holiday holidays, they were still asked for 
the average number of hours they spend wor-
king on a daily basis. The second part of the 
questionnaire was focused on finding ways 
to compensate for the work of top managers, 
and this area contained 13 questions, some of 
which were divided into sub-questions. The 
manager should divide their compensation 
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into a fixed and variable component and de-
fine the basic ways of rewarding their work, 
averaging their monthly gross wage or ex-
pressing their opinion on the company’s 
remuneration system. The third part of the 
questionnaire looked at worker motivation 
and contained 2 questions. The first question 
concealed 6 statements for which the man-
ager could choose from a range of 5 answers 
. The second question in this category was 
optional and the respondent could express 
their desire for a change in the company’s 
remuneration system, specifically related 
to their job position. The last fourth part of 
the questionnaire surveyed the information 
about the company, i.e. the region in which 
the company is based, how many staff mem-
bers it currently employs, what the com-
pany’s turnover was in the past, what line 
of business it is engaged in, how long the 
company has existed or whether it is a pu-
rely Czech company or part of multinational 
corporations. Finally, the respondents could 
leave their contact for future collaboration.
For faster data collection and more effi-
cient questionnaire evaluation, the Google 
online questionnaire was used and all re-
spondents responded electronically. Most 
questions were constructed as closed ques-
tions. If the respondent had to express their 
personal opinion, the Likert’s 5-degree scale 
was used.
3.  Results and discussions
Of the 75 respondents who answered the 
questionnaire, there were 56 men (74.7%). 
In terms of the age, the most numerous 
group of respondents was 36–45 year olds – 
30 (40%), the second largest group was the 
age group of 46–55 years (28%). In the top 
management position, some life experiences 
are needed, and therefore the author believes 
that the age structure of the respondents co-
rresponds exactly to this fact. On average, 
the respondents have been working on seni-
or management positions for 10 years, which 
was answered by 41.3% of the respondents. 
Interesting data has been obtained from the 
questions about the time they spend working. 
A total of 28 respondents (37.3%) replied that 
they had a working week of 46–50 hours; 
another 26 respondents (34.7%) said they 
were working 41–45 hours a week. 44 re-
spondents (60%) stated that they were wor-
king on holidays or on public holidays and 
spend 2–3 hours on average daily.
The first series of the questions focused 
on changing the remuneration system for 
these workers, whether there has been a 
change in the remuneration system over the 
past 3 years, and how this change has been 
reflected in individual compensation com-
ponents, i.e. the salary, personal valuations, 
other monetary rewards and benefits. Due to 
the wide range of companies that have been 
approached for the research and each indi-
vidual perceives other concepts of bonuses 
or rewards, the author chooses the generic 
term “other monetary rewards”. Benefits 
and employee benefits have been included 
here for the reasons of comprehensiveness, 
but do not count towards the monthly gross 
salary. Thus, if there has been a change in 
remuneration, these changes have evolved in 
a positive direction, especially for the fixed 
part of the salary, i.e. the salary base. Only a 
few groups of the respondents replied with a 
reduction in some of the salary components.
The respondents also had to identify and 
select the factors that, in their view, had an 
impact on the change in remuneration. They 
could choose more answers and the results of 
this question are displayed in Figure 1.
The average earnings information system 
administered by the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs of the Czech Republic lists the 
amount of earnings broken down by indivi-
dual job positions. Updating of these data 
takes place at half-year intervals. From the 
selection of positions, the author chose the 
position of “top representatives of compa-
nies”, whose job description is described 
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according to the methodology of the Czech 
Statistical Office as follows: “These employ-
ees have, in particular, the responsibility for 
decisions in the area of overall strategic and 
operational management of the enterprise or 
organisational unit goods produced, servi-
ces provided), in the area of budgets (how 
many and for what purposes) and in the area 
of the selection and dismissal of employees. 
“(CSO, 2011). In the Information System, 
the category of top executives of 250 or more 
employees was selected to determine their 
earnings so that this figure could be com-
pared with the answers to the questionnaire 
survey. According to a ministry survey, the 
weighted average wage of these representati-
ves is CZK 107,766 / month (MLSA, 2018). 
The weighted average in the questionnaire 
survey was 103,833 CZK / month and is the-
refore very similar to the weighted average, 
which was set in the Information System of 
the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. 
The above-calculated weighted average 
gross salary for managers of large corpora-
tions is confirmed by Merhebi’s theoretical 
assumptions (stated in the theoretical part 
of the article) that the salary of a manager is 
influenced by the size of the enterprise: the 
bigger the business, the higher the rewards 
of top management.
Due to the theoretical assumption of sala-
ry dependence on the enterprise size, it was 
an attempt to confirm this claim also in the 
questionnaire survey. The respondents selec-
ted the interval of the gross monthly salary as 
part of the questionnaire survey. The enter-
prise size for confirming this hypothesis was 
categorised according to the number of em-
ployees in the enterprise, which the respon-
dents stated in an open question in part 4 of 
the questionnaire. To confirm this hypothe-
sis, the responses were merged into selected 
intervals, and the dependence of these two 
elements is described in Table 2.
Based on the table above, it is possible to 
compare the test result based on chi-quadra-
te statistics and confirm or not to accept the 
zero hypothesis. The hypotheses are deter-
mined as follows:
H0:  Business size does not affect the man-
ager’s gross monthly salary.
H1:  Business size affects the manager’s gross 
monthly salary.
The Pearson’s Chi-quadrate test did not 
confirm the dependence, but this test ranks for 
more general statistical methods that use un-
sorted data. As the author has sorted the data, 
he uses the Kendall’s correlation coefficient, 
otherwise known as Kendall’s tau. During this 
testing, the data was sorted out and specified.
Based on the significance of the Kendall 
coefficient test, the close relationship be-
tween the selected variables was found. This 
significance is 0.009 according to Table 3.
Figure 1.  Factors influencing the change in salary components. Source: Author’s own study.
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From the point of view of future research 
on the creation of a new methodology for the 
remuneration of top managers in the Czech 
Republic, one of the most important issues of 
the structured questionnaire survey is: “Does 
the remuneration system in the company 
gain ownership?” 62 respondents (82.7%) 
certainly did not agree with this question, 
and 7 respondents (9.3%) responded rather 
not. 92% of the respondents have no oppor-
tunity to acquire ownership in the company. 
25 respondents (34.6%) also replied that the 
company they were currently working in is 
part of a multinational corporation and used 
the parent company’s remuneration system. 
This fact can affect the respondents who said 
they did not have the opportunity to acquire 
a stake in the company.
Based on the obtained answers, the author 
sought to find the dependence between the 
possibility of acquiring the ownership interest 
in the company and the main line of business 
of the company according to the CZ NACE 
categorisation. For the questionnaire survey, 
large manufacturing enterprises were selec-
ted, i.e. category C. Table 4 summarises the 
data on the following variables:
Table 4 summarises the questionnaire 
survey data for two variables, namely the 
possibility of acquiring ownership interest 
in the company and the main line of busi-
ness according to CZ NACE. The answers 
Yes and No in the table summarise the re-
spondents’ answers from the questionnaire. 
Asked if they have the opportunity to get a 
stake in the company, the respondents could 
choose from the answers: yes, rather yes, I 
do not know, rather not and certainly not. To 
confirm this hypothesis, there was a connec-
tion between the answers yes and rather yes, 
as well as the merging of the answers rather 
not and definitely not. The answers I did not 
know were excluded from this test. In cate-
gory C according to CZ NACE there are 24 
sections, which have been grouped into se-
veral groups according to the relation of the 
Table 2.  Determining the relationship between variable income levels and the number of employees.
Income category
Number of employees
Up to 500 501–1000 1001–1500 Over 1500
Up to 50 000 CZK 5 4 1 1
50 001–75 000 CZK 6 9 1 0
75 001–100 000 CZK 2 7 0 4
100 001–125 000 CZK 1 2 1 0
125 001–150 000 CZK 3 8 2 3
150 001–175 000 CZK 1 2 2 0
175 001–200 000 CZK 1 1 1 0
Over 200 000 CZK 0 2 0 3
Source: Author’s own study.
Table 3.  Explaining the dependence of two elements through Kendall’s tau.
Symmetric Measures
Approximate Significance




N of Valid Cases
Source: Author’s own study.
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focus. The description of the sections is pro-
vided in the Appendix to the article.
On the basis of the theoretical knowledge, the 
author believes that there may be a close rela-
tionship between these two elements. A prere-
quisite for whether a manager can acquire an 
ownership interest in an enterprise is both the 
current ownership structure and the line of busi-
ness. If a firm is a subsidiary, then management 
will not be able to acquire ownership, and the 
holding organisation is just typical for certain 
business areas, such as the automotive industry.
The following hypotheses are based on Ta-
ble 2:
H0:  The ability to acquire ownership in a bu-
siness is not dependent on the company’s 
line of business.
H1:  The ability to acquire an ownership in-
terest in a business is dependent on the 
company’s line of business.
On the basis of the Pearson’s chi-square 
quadratic significance, the close relationship 
between these variables was found. This sig-
nificance is 0.043. The strength of the relati-
onship is given by the contingency coeffici-
ent, which is 0.434 (Table 5).
When asked the question concerning the 
ownership (Does, the pay system allow you 
to acquire ownership?), the respondents an-
swered negatively; they were also asked 
whether they would like to have this option, 
i.e. whether they want to acquire a stake in 
the company they work in. Altogether, 70 re-
spondents replied to this question. Of these, 
19 respondents (27.1%) and 17 respondents 
(24.3%) did. Thus, over 50% of respondents 
would be interested in acquiring ownership 
interests in the companies they work in. The 
negative answer was chosen by 23 respon-
dents (32.9%) and 11 respondents (15.7%) 
did not choose any answer.
Based on testing the previous hypothesis, 
the author tried to find out whether there is 
also the dependence between the desire to 
acquire the ownership interest and the line 
of business of the company according to the 
CZ NACE categorisation. Summarising the 
responses is the same as in previous hypo-
thesis testing. The recorded answers are su-
mmarised in Table 6.
According to the results of Table 3, the fo-
llowing hypotheses were established:
Table 4.  Determination of the link between the variables of the Possibility to acquire the ownership interest 











































Yes 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 2 1
No 7 2 2 3 4 2 4 19 10 6
Source: Author’s own study.
Table 5.  Expression of the dependence of two elements through the Pearson’s Chi-quadrate.
Chi-Square Tests
Value df Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 17.417a 9 .043
Likelihood Ratio 15.700 9 .073
Linear-by-Linear Association .313 1 .576
N of Valid Cases 75
Source: Author’s own study.
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H0:  The desire to acquire an ownership inte-
rest in the company is not dependent on 
the company’s business.
H1:  The desire to acquire an ownership inte-
rest in a business depends on the subject 
of the company’s business.
Based on the significance of the Pearson’s 
Chi quadrate, there was no close relationship 
between these selected variables. This signi-
ficance was 0.427.
Choosing the most appropriate remune-
ration system for key employee employees 
is part of a complex business management 
process. The definition of this activity is a 
complex theoretical issue that is affected by 
many different approaches in the field. A new 
approach to the top management remunerati-
on system could consist in acquiring a stake 
in the company based on their performance 
and increasing the value of the business. That 
is why in the article, the author tried to find 
the dependence between the possibility of 
acquiring an ownership interest in the com-
pany and the line of business. In the Czech 
Republic, this dependence was confirmed by 
the Pearson’s Chi-quadrate test.
Linking and reconciling the interests of 
managers and owners is a key business issue 
for the company, because this alignment re-
duces representation costs and boosts the 
value of the business. If management has 
the ability to acquire ownership interests in 
the company where they works, their loyal-
ty and responsibility for the entire business 
will grow. For this reason, it was determi-
ned whether the management in the Czech 
environment has the possibility to acquire a 
shareholding in the company. In the top ma-
nagement remuneration model, the leverage 
of wealth also plays an important role.
When creating a remuneration model, it is 
necessary to take into account the structure 
of wealth management, which significantly 
influences their remuneration. The sharehol-
der has a very strong interest in increasing 
the value of the business by increasing their 
own wealth through their share in the com-
pany. If a manager does not own a stake in a 
company, then an increase in the value of the 
business will not entail an increase in pay, 
nor any additional remuneration or any addi-
tional return. Just as their annual salary did 
not change, neither their labour market price 
nor the value of their property changed. If 
the manager owns only a negligible percen-
tage of the share in the company, the wealth 
leverage will have a very low impact on their 
motivation (Young, O’Byrney, 2001).
It is certainly worth looking for answers to 
other questions that have emerged during the 
research. In further deeper exploration of the 
structured questionnaire survey, it would be 
advisable to rely on the limitations of the ques-
tionnaire survey, which include, for example, 
the emphasis on company tracking and remu-
neration systems according to other characte-
ristics: more detailed ownership structures or 
more specific analysis of individual forms of 
management remuneration. The barrier and 
limitations of the research indicate that the se-
lected enterprises were different, and there was 
no narrow specification of the research sample.
Table 6.  Determination of the link between the variables the desire to acquire the ownership interest in the 











































Yes 2 0 1 2 2 7 1 11 7 3
No 5 1 0 0 3 4 1 5 2 2
Source: Author’s own study.
Kateřina Jančíková: The issue of Remuneration of High-Ranking Managers in Enterprises of the Czech Republic
97
5.  Conclusion
Employee remuneration is a very broad topic 
that can be analysed and assessed from many 
angles. The questionnaire survey showed 
that in the Czech Republic, management is 
rewarded depending on the work performan-
ce and the achieved economic results of the 
company. Only a very small percentage of 
the respondents replied that their wage was 
linked to an indicator of economic added 
value. In this article, the statistical method 
of assumption of the dependence of the size 
of the company on the gross monthly salary 
of the manager was confirmed. The author 
then focused on the possibility of acquiring 
ownership of the company, believing that 
this is one of the key prerequisites for crea-
ting an effective remuneration contract for 
these key employees. If they are interested 
in this business, then their efforts are being 
stepped up for the proper management of the 
business and the increase of its value, while 
at the same time reducing the representati-
on costs. Managers are not simply trying to 
maximise their own benefit. In the Czech 
Republic, the possibility of acquiring owner-
ship in a company is dependent on the main 
line of the company’s business and hen-
ce the branch in which it operates. Table 3 
shows that managers have the opportunity to 
acquire ownership in the rubber and plastic 
products industry (C19+C22) or the manu-
facture of motor vehicles (C29+C30). More 
than 50% of the respondents also said they 
would be interested in acquiring ownership 
interests in companies, which could be a new 
way of rewarding them.
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Appendix
C10 Manufacture of food products
C11 Manufacture of beverages
C12 Manufacture of tobacco products
C13 Manufacture of textiles
C14 Manufacture of wearing apparel
C15 Manufacture of leather and related products
C16 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; 
manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials
C17 Manufacture of paper and paper products
C18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media
C19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products
C20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
C21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations
C22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
C23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
C24 Manufacture of basic metals
C25 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
C26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products
C27 Manufacture of electrical equipment
C28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
C29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
C30 Manufacture of other transport equipment
C31 Manufacture of furniture
C32 Other manufacturing
C33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment
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